Category Archives: Authentication

NTP Authentication on Pulse Connect Secure

I initially wanted to show how to use NTP authentication on a Pulse Connect Secure. Unfortunately, it does not support NTP over IPv6, which is mandatory for my lab. Ok, after I calmed down a bit, a configured it with legacy IP and got NTP authentication running. ;) Here’s how:

Continue reading NTP Authentication on Pulse Connect Secure

Infoblox Grid Manager NTP Authentication

Configuring NTP authentication on the Infoblox Grid Master is quite simple. Everything is packed inside the single “NTP Grid Config” menu. You just have to enter the NTP keys respectively key IDs and enable authentication on the appropriate servers. In the case of incorrect authentication values an error message is logged. Very good, since this is not the case on some other network security devices (Palo, Forti).

Too bad that it only supports MD5 while SHA-1 should be used instead of.

Continue reading Infoblox Grid Manager NTP Authentication

Fortinet FortiGate (not) using NTP Authentication

A security device such as a firewall should rely on NTP authentication to overcome NTP spoofing attacks. Therefore I am using NTP authentication on the FortiGate as well. As always, this so-called next-generation firewall has a very limited GUI while you need to configure all details through the CLI. I hate it, but that’s the way Fortinet is doing it. Furthermore the “set authentication” command is hidden unless you’re downgrading to NTPv3 (?!?) and it only supports MD5 rather than SHA-1. Not that “next-generation”!

Finally, you have no chance of knowing whether NTP authentication is working or not. I intentionally misconfigured some of my NTP keys which didn’t change anything in the NTP synchronization process while it should not work at all. Fail!

Continue reading Fortinet FortiGate (not) using NTP Authentication

Palo Alto Networks NGFW using NTP Authentication

Everyone uses NTP, that’s for sure. But are you using it with authentication on your own stratum 1 servers? You should since this is the only way to provide security against spoofed NTP packets, refer to Why should I run own NTP Servers?. As always, Palo Alto has implemented this security feature in a really easy way, since it requires just a few clicks on the GUI. (Which again is much better than other solutions, e.g., FortiGate, which requires cumbersome CLI commands.) However, monitoring the NTP servers, whether authentication was successful or not, isn’t implemented in a good way. Here we go:

Continue reading Palo Alto Networks NGFW using NTP Authentication

Meinberg LANTIME NTP Authentication

Operating NTP in a secure manner requires the usage of NTP authentication, refer to my Why should I run own NTP Servers? blogpost. Using the Meinberg LANTIME NTP appliance with NTP authentication is quite simply since it requires just a few clicks. Even adding more and more keys (which requires manual work on any other Linux ntp installation) is done within clicks. That’s the way it should be.

Continue reading Meinberg LANTIME NTP Authentication

NTP Authentication: Server Side

As already pointed out in my NTP intro blogpost Why should I run own NTP Servers? it is crucial to leverage NTP authentication to have the highest trustworthiness of your time distribution all over your network. Hence the first step is to enable NTP authentication on your own stratum 1 NTP servers, in my case two Raspberry Pis with DCF77/GPS reference clocks.

Continue reading NTP Authentication: Server Side

Dual-Stack EIGRP Lab

Yet another routing protocol I played with in my lab. ;) This time: EIGRP, Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol, the proprietary distance-vector routing protocol developed by Cisco, which is now public available (RFC 7868). However, no third-party products in here but only Cisco routers. I am using named EIGRP for both Internet Protocols, IPv6 and legacy IP, along with MD5 authentication and redistribution from OSPF.

Continue reading Dual-Stack EIGRP Lab

OSPFv3 with IPsec Authentication

Here comes a small lab consisting of three Cisco routers in which I used OSPFv3 for IPv6 with IPsec authentication. I am listing the configuration commands and some show commands. Furthermore, I am publishing a pcapng file so that you can have a look at it with Wireshark by yourself.

Continue reading OSPFv3 with IPsec Authentication

OSPFv2 Capture

I already had an OSPFv2 for IPv4 lab on my blog. However, I missed capturing a pcap file in order to publish it. So, here it is. Feel free to have a look at another small lab with three Cisco routers and OSPFv2. Just another pcapng file to practise some protocol and Wireshark skills.

Continue reading OSPFv2 Capture

Basic MP-BGP Lab: Cisco Router, Palo Alto, Fortinet

While playing around in my lab learning BGP I configured iBGP with Multiprotocol Extensions (exchanging routing information for IPv6 and legacy IP) between two Cisco routers, a Palo Alto Networks firewall, and a Fortinet FortiGate firewall. Following are all configuration steps from their GUI (Palo) as well as their CLIs (Cisco, Fortinet). It’s just a “basic” lab because I did not configure any possible parameter such as local preference or MED but left almost all to its defaults, except neighboring from loopbacks, password authentication and next-hop-self.

Continue reading Basic MP-BGP Lab: Cisco Router, Palo Alto, Fortinet

Lastline SSH Key-Based Authentication for “monitoring” User

If you are using a Lastline device (Manager, Engine, Sensor or Pinbox) you can reach the machine via SSH after you activated it via monitoring_user_password . However, per default this uses only a password for authentication. If you want to use the key-based authentication for this “monitoring” user account you can add the public key to the authorized_keys file for that user.

This is a small record on how to add a public key to the Lastline device. However, it is quite general since the Lastline appliance is built upon a standard Ubuntu server.

Continue reading Lastline SSH Key-Based Authentication for “monitoring” User

SSHFP: Authenticate SSH Fingerprints via DNSSEC

This is really cool. After DNSSEC is used to sign a complete zone, SSH connections can be authenticated via checking the SSH fingerprint against the SSHFP resource record on the DNS server. With this way, administrators will never get the well-known “The authenticity of host ‘xyz’ can’t be established.” message again. Here we go:

Continue reading SSHFP: Authenticate SSH Fingerprints via DNSSEC