Working with Infoblox can be challenging when it comes to their naming of features, licenses, marketing slides, and GUI options. So let’s bring some clarity into this chaos. :D I have listed the most common DNS security features and their corresponding Infoblox names. I hope you folks can use it as well.
This post is not about software but hardware tools for network admins. Which network gadgets am I using during my daily business? At least three, namely the Airconsole, the Pockethernet and the ProfiShark, which help me in connecting to serial ports, testing basic network connectivity, and capturing packets in a high professional way. Come in and have a look at how I’m working.
I was interested in how a recursive DNS server resolves DNS queries in detail. That is, not only the mere AAAA or A record, but also DNSSEC keys and signatures, the authority and additional section when testing with dig , and so on. For this I made two simple DNS queries to my recursive DNS server which resulted in more than 100 DNS packets at all. Wow.
In the following I am publishing a downloadable pcap so that you can analyse it by yourself. Furthermore I am showing some listings and screenshots to get an idea of the DNS resolution process.
Cisco’s IOS offers an easy to use feature for configuration versioning to an external server such as TFTP or SCP. Furthermore, you can use IOS commands to compare any two snapshots and to roll back to one of them.
While there are many approaches on how to structure your IPv6 prefix into /64 subnets (blogposts, books, talks) there are only a few hints what you can do with the other 64 bits of the addresses, namely the IPv6 interface identifier or IID. To my mind you can put some (but not too much) logic into those IIDs to a) have some structure for your addresses that b) helps you identifying those addresses when seeing them in logs or anywhere else. Hence it is easier for you to remember the IPv6 address behind a name (forward DNS) as well as the host when seeing the address (reverse DNS).
This post just shows the approach I am using in my lab. You might find it useful or you might disagree completely. Anyhow, feel free to comment your experiences or solutions for that. :D I am wondering why there isn’t much discussion about these IIDs at all. Maybe for some good reasons I am not seeing yet?
Some time ago I published a pcap that can be used to study basic IPv6 protocol messages such as ICMPv6 for Router Advertisements, Neighbor Solicitations, etc.: “Basic IPv6 Messages: Wireshark Capture“. You can use it to learn the basic IPv6 address assignment and layer 2 address resolution. However, that pcap does not include any upper layer protocols.
This time I captured a few application layer protocols that I used over IPv6 rather than over legacy IP. Common user protocols such as DNS, HTTP/S, IMAP, SMTP, as well as some network administration protocols: SSH, SNMP, and Ping. It is not that interesting at all ;) though you can use it to have some examples for Wireshark to prove that those application protocols are almost the same when run above IPv6 compared to IPv4.
Since a couple of months I am carrying a ProfiShark 1G always with me. It’s a small network aggregation TAP that fits into my bag (unlike almost any other TAPs or switches with SPAN functionalities). It runs solely via USB 3.0, hence no additional power supply nor network port on my laptop is required to get it running.
In this post I’ll give some hints on how to use the ProfiShark 1G with Windows (read: some initial problems I had and how to solve them) as well as some use cases out of my daily work with it.
In my last blogpost I showed how to perform a DNSSEC KSK rollover. I did it quite slowly and carefully. This time I am looking into an emergency rollover of the KSK. That is: What to do if your KSK is compromised and you must replace it IMMEDIATELY.
I am listing the procedures and commands I used to replace the KSK of my delegated subdomain dyn.weberdns.de with BIND. And as you might already suggest it, I am showing DNSViz graphs after every step since it greatly reveals the current DNSKEYs etc.
Probably the most crucial part in a DNSSEC environment is the maintenance of the key-signing key, the KSK. You should rollover this key on a regular basis, though not that often as the zone signing keys, the ZSKs. I am doing a KSK rollover every 2 years.
In the following I will describe the two existing methods for a KSK rollover along with a step-by-step guide how I performed such a rollover for my zone “weberdns.de”. Of course again with many graphics from DNSViz (with “redundant edges”) that easily reveal the keys and signatures at a glance.
If you are already familiar with DNSSEC this is quite easy: How to sign a delegated subdomain zone. For the sake of completeness I am showing how to generate and use the appropriate DS record in order to preserve the chain of trust for DNSSEC.
Until now I generated all SSHFP resource records on the SSH destination server itself via ssh-keygen -r <name>. This is quite easy when you already have an SSH connection to a standard Linux system. But when connecting to third party products such as routers, firewalls, whatever appliances, you don’t have this option. Hence I searched and found a way to generate SSHFP resource records remotely. Here we go:
This is actually a bad user experience problem: To generally omit the manual verification of SSH key fingerprints I am using SSHFP. With fully qualified domain names (FQDN) as the hostname for SSH connections such as ssh nb10.weberlab.de this works perfectly. However, admins are lazy and only use the hostname without the domain suffix to connect to their servers since the domain search does the rest: ssh nb10. Not so for SSHFP which fails since the default OpenSSH client does not use canonicalization for its DNS queries. Hence you must explicitly enable canonicalization for OpenSSH.
What is the biggest problem of PGP? The key distribution. This is well-known and not new at all. What is new is the OPENPGPKEY DNS resource record that delivers PGP public keys for mail addresses. If signed and verified with DNSSEC a mail sender can get the correct public key for his recipient. This solves both key distribution problems: 1) the delivery of the public key and 2) the authenticity of the key itself, i.e., that you’re using the correct key to encrypt a mail.
The “DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Bindings for OpenPGP” is specified in the experimental RFC 7929. Let’s have a look on how you can add your public key into the zone file of your DNS server.
I really like the kind of security features that are easy to use. The CAA “DNS Certification Authority Authorization” is one of those, specified in RFC 6844. As a domain administrator you must only generate the appropriate CAA records and you’re done. (Unlike other security features such as HPKP that requires deep and careful planning or DANE which is not used widely.) Since the check of CAA records is mandatory for CAs since 8. September 2017, the usage of those records is quite useful because it adds another layer of security.
I am using Nmap every time I installed a new server/appliance/whatever in order to check some unknown open ports from the outside. In most situations I am only doing a very basic run of Nmap without additional options or NSE scripts.
Likewise I am interested in how the Nmap connections appear on the wire. Hence I captured a complete Nmap run (TCP and UDP) and had a look at it with Wireshark. If you’re interested too, feel free to download the following pcap and have a look at it by yourself. At least I took some Wireshark screenshots to give a first glance about the scan.